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Abstract
Whoever exists belongs to a species  which did not become extinct 
has a genotype  which should be well adjusted  and lives in a habitat
which has been sustainable for a long time To capture the rst aspect we
allow for interspecies competition and analyze the conditions for species
survival The second aspect refers to success in intraspecies competition of
genotypes as in evolutionary biology and game theory Survival in inter
and intraspecies competition together with sustainability dene ecological
stability  a concept which we illustrate by an example of solitary and social
grazers who compete for food supply and who are endangered by the same
predators Although our approach is inspired by empirical evidence  no
systematic attempt is made to apply it to some specic ecology
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  Introduction
Having survived means
 i to belong to a species which has not  yet become extinct
 ii that ones genetic program is well adjusted to the habitat  including the
population composition of ones own species in which one lives and
 iii that the habitat is used by all its inhabitants in a sustainable way
Requirement  i is what we mean by species survival Condition  ii refers to the
familiar idea of evolutionarily stable strategies and its variations  eg Maynard
Smith and Price  and Maynard Smith 	
 Of course the two processes
of species and strategy selection can be only well dened for a given possibly
stochastic habitat which must be sustainable  see Ostrom et al  for sus
tainability of human habitats since strategy selection but also species selection
may need a long time to converge The concept of ecological stability requires
that the genotypes or strategies of all existing species are evolutionarily stable
that no other species can enter the habitat and thereby endanger the existing
species and that all existing species together make use of the habitat which does
not question its future existence
What can such a  more general  concept explain In our view many existing
species  among them many primate species especially those like chimpanzees or
bonoboes which are closely related to mankind but also less developed species
like birds  eg the great tit see Aumann 	 as well as Regelmann and Curio
	  display a lot of cooperative behavior eg by collectively watching out
for predators by collectively ghting against predators etc A further impres
sive example are  nonrelated bats who engage in cooperative insurance against
starvation by allowing nonsuccessful hunters to drink the blood of the more suc
cessful hunters If one just requires evolutionary stability eg in the sense that

no mutant strategy is a better reply against the actual species behavior it often
seems that a mutant who more or less openly is shirking could do better
What one should clearly distinguish here is mutation in the sense of adopting
another strategy by a given species and behavioral changes due to exchanging
species So for instance solitary animals cannot just behave more cooperatively
since this requires a social group which does not exist for solitary animals Sim
ilarly shirking from cooperation in a socially living species can only mean to be
less involved in cooperative behavior and not to change to solitary life Male
lions for instance are often rather inactive during the hunt but they may be
nonsubstitutable when actually trying to throw down large prey eg a bualo
or when defending a catch against other predators eg hyaenas Here a strategy
change as studied in evolutionary biology or game theory could mean to become
more or less active in collective hunting
If shirking is observable it can be easily punished by assigning lower ranks  and
thereby lower reproductive success in the pecking order Thus for a given species
of socially living animals cooperation can be stabilized by evolutionary stability of
strategies ie by intraspecies competition of strategies More dramatic deviations
from cooperative behavior eg by refraining from any kind of cooperation seems
for most socially living species no alternative since they will end most surely in
starvation A solitary lion will for instance hardly be successful in hunting Such
changes in behavior will thus have to explained by substituting species ie by
interspecies competition to which we refer as species survival
This does not exclude that a similar species exists which only diers in the social
structuring of the species population So our main example involves solitary
grazers and social grazers which we assume to be rather similar except for their
social structuring They nevertheless belong to dierent species ie the strategies
of solitary grazers are nonfeasible for social grazers and vice versa which however
does not exclude that they may have similar implications
The main purpose of our example is to illustrate the possibility that only the
rather cooperatively behaving social grazers survive species selection We thus


explain cooperative behavior not by strategy selection but simply by showing
that the evolutionarily stable strategies of solitary and social grazers may in a
given habitat result in higher tness of social grazers as compared to solitary
ones
In the following section 
 we rst dene the concept of ecological stability which we
then illustrate by our example of solitary and social grazers Like in evolutionary
biology and game theory stability conditions can be either static or dynamic
In our Conclusions we are summarize our discussion of ecological stability and
compare this concept to other ways of explaining cooperation
 Ecological Stability
When dening the concept of ecological stability we rely on the notation of Ta
ble II Here the set A of species a is assumed to include all possible species
the existing and the nonexisting ones For each species a   A the possible set
of behaviors is S
a
 Clearly knowing S
a
for a nonexisting species is often di
cult In case of extinct but formerly existing species it is nevertheless possible 
all dinosaurs could not y and we know which were vegetarian and which were
carniverous
We do not necessarily want to defend our denition of a habitat H by its compo
nents N
a
 ie the population distributions over strategies in S
a
for all a   A as
well as by its other characteristics   as the most natural one But it seems well
suited for dening the concept of ecological stability
That the numberN
a
of animals of species a   A is bounded  from above probably
needs no justication Clearly the upper bound N
a
for N
a
will depend on H ie
on how the habitat is inhabited and on its other characteristics  
The lower bound N
a
for N
a
can be justied in several ways Many species espe
cially the sexually reproducing ones require a minimal population size to prevent

inbreeding andor to guarantee sucient chances for mating Also catastrophic
eg climatic events species specic epedemies short time overpopulation of
predators can endanger a species a   A if its population size is too small This
lower bound N
a
for N
a
will often depend on H as it is true for the upper bound
N
a

A set of dierent species a
S
a
 
n
s
a
 
  s
a
ma
o
set of strategies genotypes of species a   A
N
a
 
 
n
a
 
  n
a
ma

population distribution of species a   A
  other  than the inhabitation characteristics of habitat
H  
 
N
a

a A
 

habitat
H   set of sustainable habitats H for a specic  
N
a
 
ma
P
i 
n
a
i
number of animals of species a   A
N
a
H upper bound for N
a
depending on H
N
a
H lower bound for N
a
depending on H
where N
a
H  N
a
H for all H   H a   A
b
n
a
s
a
i
H tnessexpected number of ospring for species
a   A when using strategy s
a
i
in habitat H
Table II Notation of section 

The tness function
b
n
a
 for all species a   A is a familiar concept in evolutionary
biology and evolutionary game theory The interpretation of
b
n
a
s
a
i
H is that
in habitat H  which includes also the population distribution N
a
over S
a

the strategy s
a
i
yields the expected number
b
n
a
i
of ospring ie if one neglects
stochastic events the new habitat H will have
b
n
a
i
animals of species a who rely
on strategy s
a
i
  S
a

With the help of this notation we now proceed to dene the concept of ecological
stability We rst adapt the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies to our

framework For a given habitat H and a given species a   A the population
distribution N
a
is evolutionarily stable if
 ES
b
n
a
s
a
i
H   max
s
a
  S
a
b
n
a
s
a
H or n
a
i
  
and if for all s
a
l
satisfying  ES
 ES

b
n
a
 
s
a
i

f
H


b
n
a
 
s
a
l

f
H

if
e
n
a
i
 n
a
i
and
e
n
a
l
 n
a
l

where
f
H diers from H at most in the components n
a
i
and n
a
l
 respectively
e
n
a
i
and
e
n
a
l

Such static conditions for evolutionary stability will of course make sense only
if they capture the requirements for dynamic stability for certain classes of evolu
tionary dynamics eg for the wellknown replicator dynamics  see Hammerstein
and Selten  as well as Weibull  for surveys In our context such
dynamics could be of the form
b
n
a
t 
s
a
i
H
t

where
b
n
a
t 
is the expected number of animals of species a relying on s
a
i
in period
t   and H
t
the habitat in the preceding period t Such evolutionary dynamic
can of course be stochastic eg in the form of probabilities
q
a
t 
 
n
a
t 
s
a
i
H
t


for observing n
a
t 
s
a
i
H
t
 animals of species a relying on s
a
i
in period t  For
such a dynamic  Markov process the dynamic analogue of the static evolutionary
stability conditions  ES and  ES
 would simply require that N
a
is a stationary
solution of the dynamic process and an at least local attractor ie when starting
in some open neighborhood of N
a
the process will converge to N
a
over time
In the following it will be assumed that for all existing species a   A the distrib
ution N
a
over S
a
is evolutionarily stable If this is true a habitat H is said to be
evolutionarily stable

An evolutionarily stable habitat H is said to satisfy species survival if for all
species a   A
 SS either N
a
H  N
a
 N
a
H or N
a
  
Similar to evolutionary stability also species survival can be given a dynamic
stability formulation If
N   N
a

a A
is the vector of numbers N
a
of animals of all species the inhabitation dynamics
could be described as
N
t 
N
t

when one assumes that the second component   of the habitat H   N   does
not change over time A habitat H   N   or its inhabitation vector N would
then satisfy species survival if N is a stationary solution of the dynamic process
N
t 
N
t
 and an at least local attractor Again there are obvious ways to gener
alize such conditions to stochastic  Markov processes
q
t 
N
t 
N
t

specifying for all N
t 
the probability of reaching the inhabitation vector N
t 
after N
t

If an evolutionarily stable habitat H satises the species survival condition  SS
for all a   A it is ecologically stable if the condition
 SH H   H  
that the habitat H is sustainable holds The explicit meaning of  SH will often
be in restrictions for the numbers of inhabitants One probably does not have
to justify that sustainability will usually require upper bounds for the numbers
N
a
of existing species with N
a
  It may however also require lower bounds
for these numbers N
a
  A large grassland habitat may for instance need a
sucient number of grazers to prevent it from becoming a large forest

Species survival limits the number of animals of a certain species a   A since
this must be in proportion to the living conditions It also means that only
those species a   A  continue to exist for which the minimal size requirement is
met Clearly a habitat must be sustainable for the sometimes long time spans
of genetical evolution  intraspecies competition of strategies and possibly also of
species selection  interspecies competition
What is missing yet is the model of interspecies competition In our view
this is most easily accomplished via the functions N
a
H Imagine for instance
two grazer species a and a   A that rely on the same food supply In such a case
the characteristics   of the habitat might dene an upper bound
N
a
N
a
 N
aa
 
only for the sum of grazers a and a   A One thus can use the familiar concept
of expected numbers of ospring ie the tness functions
b
n
a
 and
b
n
a
 to
determine whether both species survive ie
N
a
 N
a
H  N
a
 N
a
H  N
a
N
a
 N
ab
 
and
b
n
a
s
a
i
H  
b
n
a
 
s
a
j
H

whenever n
a
i
 n
a
j
 
or just one ie after a process with
b
n
a
 
b
n
a
 or
b
n
a
 
b
n
a

species a respectively a nally reaches
b
n
a
  N
a
 respectively
b
n
a
  N
a
and
thus becomes extinct
Other two species
e
a and
b
a in A may however rely on dierent food supply of
the habitat H Let
e
a be for instance the prey species which is main diet of the
predator species
b
a   A Clearly the upper bound N
ba
will then mainly depend
on the component N
ea
of H in the sense that N
ba
will increase when N
a
becomes
larger Thus whenever trying to model interspecies competition ie when asking
which species a   A nally satisfy the rst alternative N
a
H  N
a
 N
a
H
of species survival  SS the model will crucially depend on the specic nature of
the competing species

Nevertheless the general nature of interspecies competition seems to be determined
by the dynamics of the numbers N
a
and N
a
H of the dierent species a in A
The species a   A which rst falls short of its minimum threshold N
a
H will
be rst in becoming extinct  one will usually assume that N
a
decreases over the
whole range   N
a
 N
a
H according to the interpretation of N
a
H As
a consequence initial conditions will often be crucial when determining which
species will continue to exist and which species become extinct We view this
path dependence of species survival as an advantage rather than a weakness
Two similar habitats may very well be dierently inhabited simply because the
initially existing species were dierent
Up till now our discussion of interspecies competition has focussed on how species
may become extinct It may however be necessary to outline also how new
species might arrive One easy way is migration of new species from neighbouring
habitats The Galapagos Islands are a striking example for a habitat without
neighbouring habitats and for interspecies competition with a therefore much
smaller set A of species An immigrant species a   A will often have to adopt
of course a dierent strategy s
a
i
  S
a
in its new habitat This again illustrates
how important it is to dierentiate between behavioral dierences due to dierent
strategy selection and those which are due to dierences in species characteristics
and how the familiar concepts of intraspecies competition or evolutionary biology
and game theory may be also useful when modelling and analyzing interspecies
competition
 An example Solitary versus social grazers
To describe the habitat of our example we rely on the same notation as in the
previous section  Table II To keep things as simple as possible let
A   fa a
e
ag
with the following interpretation
	
a the solitary grazers
a the social grazers
e
a the only predator species
It seems reasonable to assume that N
a
and N
a
are subjected to a joint upper
bound of the form
N
a
N
a
 N
aa
 
whereas
N
ea
H   N
a
N
a

Thus the total number N
a
N
a
of grazers in the habitat is limited by the other
characteristics   of the habitat H whereas for the predator species
e
a   A which
lives on both species of grazers the upper bound N
a
H is the total number
N
a
N
a
of prey
Let w N
a
 denote the probability by which an animal of species a   A whose total
number is N
a
 is spotted by a predator For social grazers a   A this probability
will also depend on the herd size h
a
so that w
 
N
a
 h
a

is the corresponding
probability for social grazers Clearly one should have
w N
a
  w
 
N
a
 h
a

for N
a
  N
a
and h
a
 
where the dierence in the probabilities should increase when h
a
becomes larger
Since w  refers to an individual animal one will typically assume that w N
a

decreases when N
a
increases both for a   a and for a   a
On the other hand the probability that an individual animal can escape after
being spotted by a predator can be much lower for solitary grazers than for social
ones Here it is assumed that a solitary grazer can allocate the time s
a
i
to grazing
and the remaining time span t
a
 s
a
i
of his total time t
a
to being on the alert
Dierent strategies s
a
i
  S
a
thus reect dierent allocations of time to grazing
and being on the alert
Social grazers who exist in herds of average size h
a
 rely on labor distribution
Whereas the number s
a
i
  S
a
of animals in the herd are on the alert all the

ha
s
a
i
remaining animals can graze Although the strategies s
a
i
and s
a
j
of solitary
respectively social grazers have quite a dierent interpretation they nevertheless
may imply the time sharing between grazing and being on the alert If t
a
denotes
the available time of social grazers then
s
a
i
 
h
a
 s
a
j
h
a
t
a
would imply the same grazing time for solitary and social grazers In social
grazers a   A of course also the herd size h
a
might be subjected to evolutionary
adaptation
One might wonder how mutation in the sense that herds of social grazers a   A
change from s
a
i
to s
a
j
can take place in social grazers a   A If a mutant s
a
j
  S
a
invades an s
a
i
monomorphic population of social grazers one might assume that
herds invidually switch to s
a
j
with positive but small probability  whereas they
continue to rely on s
a
i
with probability  
Let q  denote the  conditional probability of escape after being spotted by a
predator In view of the interpretation of the strategies we assume
q s
a
i
  q
 
s
a
j

for s
a
i
 s
a
j
and
q
 
s
a
i

 q
 
s
a
j

for s
a
i
 s
a
j

Thus the overall survival probability S a of a grazer a   fa ag is
S s
a
i
     w   q  for all s
a
i
  S
a

To keep our example as simple as possible we assume that the tness
b
n
a
s
a
i
H
of species a   fa ag using strategy s
a
i
  S
a
is the product of grazing time and
survival probability S s
i
a
 ie
b
n
a
s
a
i
H   s
a
i
 w N
a
   q s
a
i

and
b
n
a
 
s
a
i
H

 
h
a
 s
a
i
h
a
t
a
 
 w
 
N
a
 h
a
 h
 q
 
s
a
i
i


Let H be a habitat which is evolutionarily stable and sustainable H   H If
 C
b
n
a
 
s
a
i
H


b
n
a
 
s
a
j
H

for n
a
i
 n
a
j
 
then this means that the number N
a
of social grazers will increase more than the
number N
a
of solitary grazers Soon or later thus social grazers will outnumber
solitary grazers If for instance
N
a
N
a
 N
aa
   max
n
N
a
 N
a
o
this surely implies the elimination of solitary grazers a   A when the initial
population size N
a
of social grazers satises N
a
 N
a

Let us discuss inequality  C whose explicit formulation is
 C
h
a
s
a
i
h
a
t
a
 
 w
 
N
a
 h
a
 h
 q
 
s
a
i
i
 s
a
j
 
 w N
a

h
 q
 
s
a
j
i
for strategies s
a
i
with n
a
i
  and s
a
j
with n
a
j
  in more detail in order to see
whether it is likely to be fullled or not Since herd size will usually be much
larger than  especially for grazers who inhabitate large plains the grazing time
t
a
 
h
a
 s
a
i

h
a
of social grazers will be far longer than s
a
j
 the grazing time of
solitary grazers This renders the condition S
 
s
a
i

 S
 
s
a
j

or
 C
 q

s
a
j

 q

s
a
i


w

N
a
 h
a

wN
a

as far too restrictive Nevertheless we want to argue that even condition  C is
likely to hold Of course the right hand side of  C can be much larger than
 On the other hand q
 
s
a
i

should be considerably larger than q
 
s
a
j

where also
this dierence will typically increase with the herd size h
a

Thus especially in habitats with large herd size h
a
of social grazers eg in habitats
with wide and open grazing grounds where dierences in the probabilities of being
spotted by predators are less important even the far too restrictive condition  C
for  C or  C will hold true Solitary grazers will then hardly be able to survive

so that ecological stability of H will usually imply N
a
   ie the extinction
of solitary grazers Habitats favoring solitary grazers should thus be those where
dierences in the probabilities of being spotted by predators are essential This
typically will require a rich vegetation  a jungle world andor uneven ground
 hilly habitats which provide ample hiding places Here one typically will expect
also small herd sizes h
a
of social grazers what seriously restricts the advantages
of cooperative behavior
 Conclusions
Our main motivation is to account for the high degree of cooperative behavior
in many species of the animal kingdom Often this can and is explained by kin
selection  Trivers 	 At least in mammals this is however a rather ques
tionable assumption although it of course explains a great deal of cooperation
is smaller units  families eg of mother and their ospring in chimpanzees see
Goodall  de Waal 	
 or of a male with his harem and the ospring of his
wives Kummer  There seems to be a need to justify cooperative behavior
in larger groups  communities which cannot be explained by kin selection
Of course in rare circumstances cooperative behavior may be also individually
optimal ie it can be justied by strategy selection eg in the sense of evolu
tionarily stable strategies An insuppressible food call  see Goodall  for a
vivid example may for instance be individually optimal if the food provided
by the habitat comes in large quantities and is perishable Like in human so
cieties it seems however that shirking ie refraining from the usual degree of
cooperativeness often appears to be individually better
What we stress here is another aspect of competition namely that between
species Of the many species which could exist only those which make ecient
use of whatever is available will survive interspecies competition Cooperative
ness can then be derived from the condition of species survival Only a species
whose strategy selection does not allow to question its relative cooperativeness


can prevent its distinction as illustrated by our example of solitary and social
grazers
There are various ways in which a species can guarantee that strategy selection
does not question the degree of cooperation in larger groups In social grazers
the animals who are supposed to watch out for predators may be the ones who
are most exposed ie they would be the most likely prey of predators It is then
clearly optimal to watch out for predators as hard as possible  what is hardly true
for human police  women who are known to shirk a lot
Another possibility is to link access to females to the investments in watching out
for predators So often the male is the one who invests most of his time in
being on the alert Also here the evolutionarily stable strategy will not question
the cooperativeness of behavior here in the sense that few animals are on the
alert allowing all others to graze peacefully
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